### Off

#### Reduce = bring to previous inferior state without cancelling

Words & Phrases: Perm Edition, 2002, vol 36A, p.80

Mass. 1905. Rev.Laws, c. 203, § 9, provides that, if two or more cases are tried together in the superior court, the presiding judge may "reduce" the witness fees and other costs, but "not less than the ordinary witness fees, and other costs recoverable in one of the cases" which are so tried together shall be allowed. Held that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced, providing that there must be left in the aggregate an amount not less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases. The word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy, or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower, or bring to an inferior state.— Green v. Sklar, 74 N.E. 595, 188 Mass. 363.

#### “On” means dependent

OED 89 Oxford English Dictionary v10 2nd Ed “On”p792

1. g. In various elliptical and transferred uses, as (a) = Stationed on, at, or in charge of; (b) subsisting or dependent on; in the charge or care of; (c) on the list or staff of, employed on; (d) on an official list. e.g. on half-pay.

#### Energy production means conversion to electricity or hydrogen

David G. Schmidt, Dahlonega, GA NOVEL COMPOSITIONS FOR USE IN BATTERIES, CAPACITORS, FUEL CELLS AND SIMILAR DEVICES AND FOR HYDROGEN PRODUCTION Pub. No.: us 2002/0037452 Al Schmidt (43) Pub. Date: Mar. 28,2002 Patent Application http://www.google.com/patents/US20020069648?

The compositions of the present invention, when configured as described herein, are designed to produce energy upon contacting either (B) aluminum, or alloys of (B) aluminum and (D) high electron mobility components, with an aqueous solution comprising base or electrolyte. The term energy production refers generally to the production of electrical energy and/or the production of hydrogen gas. Therefore, one aspect of the present invention is the combination of components to form alloys that will be used in the production and storage of energy.

#### The affirmative only removes restrictions on siting- not energy production

#### Our interpretation is best- the topic is inherently bidirectional in the sense that the aff says topical energy sources are bad most of the time because of the mix of fossil fuels and renewables- the only limit is that the aff should have to directly increase energy production- numerous peripheral restrictions that prevent energy production mean this topic could get out of hand really fast

#### Topicality is fundamentally a question of competing interpretations about the limits of the topic- if they explode the topic it prevents meaningful stasis and debate

### Off

#### Text: The United States Supreme Court should rule that state restrictions on local solar siting are unconstitutional.

#### Supreme court can rule against restrictions on energy production

Craig 2010 (Robin Kundis Craig, Attorneys' Title Professor and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University College of Law, Summer 2010, “MULTISTATE DECISION MAKING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRANSMISSION: SPOTLIGHT ON COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, UTAH, AND WYOMING: Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects,” University of Colorado Law Review, Lexis)

A number of dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved energy production, and they systematically conclude that states cannot create legal requirements or preferences based on the source of the fuel or energy. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that required Oklahoma coal-fired electric power plants producing power for sale in Oklahoma to burn a mixture of coal containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal. 121 Moreover, the "savings clause" of the Federal Power Act did not prevent the conclusion that the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional. 122 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that a Clean Air Act compliance plan that favored Illinois coalviolated the dormant Commerce Clause. 123¶ Nor can states "hoard" state-created energy within their borders. Thus, in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that New Hampshire could not constitutionally restrict interstate transportation of hydroelectric power generated in New Hampshire. 124

#### The counterplan is not a *reduction*—it requires executive/congressional acquiescence.

Spiro, 2001 (Peter J. Spiro, Professor, Hofstra University School of Law; Visiting Professor, University of Texas School of Law, Texas Law Review, April, lexis)

The increments approach answers these objections, at the same time that it affirms the value of constitutionalism. It presents, first of all, a determinate method of constitutional location. Unlike translation exercises, the increments model substantially confines the possible discretion of individual constitutional actors, including the judiciary. Working from a premise of historical situatedness, the theory denies the possibility of independent constitutional determination. That is not to deny the inevitability of constitutional change. But all constitutional actors work from a baseline, departures from which can be challenged and rejected by other constitutional actors. Constitutional norms are resolved only by the interplay of those actors. The content of constitutional norms will usually be reflected in institutional action, but one cannot necessarily find the law by reference to the action of any single institution alone. Even if the Supreme Court attempted to exploit the discretion afforded it by a translation model, its pronouncements amount to mere artifacts in the absence of acceptance by other actors. The increments model thus answers the primary volley of the originalists against countermajoritarian judicial adaptation of the constitutional text. Such adaptation will not prevail where it is rejected by other actors.

### Off

#### Obama wins easily absent future events – conventions, combined data prove – counterspin is self interested

Bruce Bartlett. 9-7-12. Why Barack Obama Will Win the Election Easily

http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2012/09/07/Why-Barack-Obama-Will-Win-the-Election-Easily.aspx#page2

Having failed rather spectacularly to correctly predict Mitt Romney’s running mate—I said it definitely would not be Paul Ryan less than 24 hours before he was picked -- I should probably avoid political predictions for a while. But as all those who make their livings in the prediction business know, the secret to success is to make so many of them that a few are bound to be right. That said, I’m going to go out on a limb and predict that Barack Obama will win the election easily, at least in the all-important Electoral College. I have thought so for some time, but wanted to wait and see if the party conventions changed the political dynamics. They have; they have made me more certain of Obama’s victory. Pollster Nate Silver has done an excellent job of assembling all of the known political data on where the presidential race stood as of Wednesday. His analysis leads him to project that Obama will beat Romney 51.2 percent to 47.6 percent in the popular vote, and 311 to 227 in the Electoral College where only 270 votes are needed to win. Overall, Silver gives Obama a 76 percent chance of winning the election. Those who don’t follow the data intensively can be forgiven for not knowing what good shape Obama is in, because it is rarely reported in the mainstream media. There is a simple reason for this: it has a huge vested interest in maintaining the idea that the election is so close it cannot be called and will come down to the last vote cast on Election Day. That is because the media have huge political operations with many highly-paid commentators who need people reading and tuning in daily to see if their preferred candidate has made any headway. There is also an enormous amount of data being produced daily that requires reporting and analysis—polls, campaign contributions, charges and counter charges, endorsements, gaffes and so on. It is not hard to spin this vast cacophony of material in such a way as to maintain the fiction that the election will be close. The media, collectively, are in the position of sports announcers calling a game where one team is heavily favored and well ahead. They need to keep people watching so that advertisers will get value for their money. So they use every cliché in the book to tell viewers that “it ain’t over till it’s over” and about all the times the losing team has come from behind to win and so on and so on. Of course, it goes without saying that once in a while, the losing team does make a comeback and wins unexpectedly. But by the time that happens, all except the winning team’s hardcore fans have changed the channel or left the stadium. However, we all know about those magical come-from-behind victories because the media have an incentive to hype them as a warning to fickle fans that they better stay tuned next time. The same is going on today with the presidential race. Reporters and commentators are building up Romney’s chances and downplaying Obama’s to keep people interested. This was most evident last week when Republican speakers at their convention were played up and their talking points repeated, as if they were changing the course of the election as they spoke. This week, they are doing the same for the Democrats. I thought the Republican convention went very poorly. And apparently, I was not the only one. According to Nielsen, television ratings for the Republican convention were down sharply from 2008. And according to Gallup, Romney’s convention “bounce” was the worst for any candidate of either party except for John Kerry in 2004—and we know what happened to him. We don’t yet know what kind of bounce Obama will get, but anecdotal evidence suggests that it will at least be significantly better than Romney’s. Whereas few Republicans raved about any convention speech other than actor Clint Eastwood’s rambling conversation with an empty chair, Democrats are raving about those by Michele Obama, Bill Clinton and a number of other speakers at their convention. To be sure, there are still opportunities for Republicans to level the playing field. There will be three debates between Romney and Obama, as well as one between the respective vice presidential nominees. They could make a difference, but history does not show that debates have much impact.

#### **Obama’s Solar push not popular-controversy**

Martin Flunk May 7, 2012 (background in economics and currency strategy at Credit Suisse, and worked as a commodities trader and an equity analyst, before becoming a journalist “Solar Power Has Been Totally Eclipsed By Gas” http://seekingalpha.com/article/565191-solar-power-has-been-totally-eclipsed-by-gas)

The failure of Obama's green energy revolution has been well publicized given the controversy surrounding the bankruptcy of solar panel manufacturer Solyndra, and the Federal money it received - to protect a big Obama donor - even when it was known the company would fail. Public investment in clean energy appears to have been "nothing but a way to shovel lucre to politically influential producers."

#### Approval ratings are key to the election

Cook, The National Journal Political Analyst, 11

(Charlie, October 27, “Underwater,” http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-obama-underwater-20111027, d/a 7-20-12, ads)

The best barometer of how a president is going to fare is his approval rating, which starts taking on predictive value about a year out. As each month goes by, the rating becomes a better indicator of the eventual results. Presidents with approval numbers above 48 to 50 percent in the Gallup Poll win reelection. Those with approval ratings below that level usually lose. If voters don’t approve of the job you are doing after four years in office, they usually don’t vote for you. Of course, a candidate can win the popular vote and still lose the Electoral College. It happened to Samuel Tilden in 1876, Grover Cleveland in 1888, and Al Gore in 2000. But the popular votes and the Electoral College numbers usually come down on the same side.

#### Obama win key to US-Russia relations – Romney’s agenda is belligerent and controversial.

Reichardt 7/9. (Adam is the Managing Editor of New Eastern Europe, “Considering Russia in the Voting Booth,” New Eastern Europe, 2012, http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/node/382)

Obama’s policy towards Russia is easier to gauge, since there has already been four years of his administration to judge. As Ross Wilson noted, “President Obama has a four-year record with Russia to defend – i.e., the reset policy and the benefits that the administration will argue have accrued from its more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to relations with Moscow.” President Obama’s policy of reset was indeed a glimmer of hope for US-Russian relations at the start of 2009, but that glimmer has all but faded. The case of Syria and Iran are clear examples of the real challenges America still faces when engaging with Russia on global issues and the Obama campaign will most likely avoid referring to the “reset” by name. “Though the Administration will not use the expression ‘reset’ too much, it can be expected to continue to emphasize pragmatism and to implement that line if the president is re-elected,” Wilson believes. Obama’s opponent, Mitt Romney, has been less clear about his position on relations with Russia, but what is revealed in recent statements and on his website shows a more controversial approach. Most telling were the comments Romney made in June 2012. On Russia, Romney has stated: "The nation which consistently opposes our actions at the United Nations has been Russia. We're of course not enemies. We're not fighting each other. There's no Cold War, but Russia is a geopolitical foe in that regard." The Romney campaign’s web site reveals several areas of focus for Russia, none of them discuss active engagement, but rather focus on taking tougher stances with Russia, including renegotiating the New Start Treaty, decreasing Europe’s energy reliance on Russia, building stronger relations with Central Asia, as well as supporting Russia’s civil society. Surprisingly, the last one, engaging Russia’s civil society, could be the most controversial. The Romney campaign web site provides a strongly worded statement that “A Romney administration will be forthright in confronting the Russian government over its authoritarian practices.” Indeed, America needs a strong leader to stand up for its position in the world, however confronting Russia on internal issues may not only offend most Russians, even in the opposition – it could hurt the entire goal of this platform. Having the American government play an active role in the changes happening inside Russia could be detrimental to US-Russian relations. Many Russians believe that changes within their own country should be driven from the Russian society. Any outside interference would hurt the legitimacy of the Russian opposition and cause the Russian elite to become even more suspicious, and perhaps even hostile, to the intentions of American foreign policy.

#### U.S.-Russian war causes extinction – most probable

Bostrom ‘2 [Nick Bostrom, professor of philosophy - Oxford University, March, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

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#### The affs use of the political as the background for their ethical action is the ultimate unethical act

Adam Thurschwell (Asst. Prof. of Law, Cleveland State University) 2003 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1193

Thus, as Derrida puts it, "ethics enjoins a politics and a law ... . but the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts ... ." n26 No determinate content issues from the ethical demand because ethics, in Derrida's (and Levinas's) sense, is non-normative. To derive a legal or political rule of decision from one's ethical responsibility would be, paradoxically, to displace that responsibility onto a "calculation," and thus would itself be unethical precisely to the extent that it relieves one of further responsibility for the decision in any given case. Ethics therefore demands a legal/political decision that can only rest on something like a "mystical foundation," n27 since such a decision cannot be founded on any determinable rules, reasons or values without abandoning its claim to ethical status. Accordingly, the legal/political decision can only be "determined beyond knowledge, beyond all presentation, all concepts" n28 - which is to say, determined on the basis of something that resembles pure faith.

#### Alternative –Reject the affirmatives displacement of their ethical commitment on outside institutions but embrace the individual ethical responsibility embodied within the 1AC

#### Their focus on the atrocities that the government creates because of things like subsidies ignores and trades off with recognizing our own personal complicity with violence. Only by refusing to make statements like “the United States Federal Government should” allows us to transform our own personal will to violence that is the root of their impacts

Susanne Kappeler (Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University) 1995 The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 75-76

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation, the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence, of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war', writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell [my friend], but I see it everywhere. It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you, in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war . . . And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible, we permit it to happen.5 'We are the war' - and we also 'are' the sexual violence, the racist violence, the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime', for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal.6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility — leading to the -well-known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens — even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia - since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN — finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like 'I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution.'7 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non-comprehension': our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

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#### Natural Gas industry is strong

Smith 2012 [Rebecca Smith Wall Street Journal 3-15-2012 “Cheap Natural Gas Unplugs U.S. Nuclear-Power Revival” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304459804577281490129153610.html]

Across the country, utilities are turning to natural gas to generate electricity, with 258 plants expected to be built from 2011 through 2015, federal statistics indicate. Not only are gas-fired plants faster to build than reactors, they are much less expensive. The U.S. Energy Information Administration says it costs about $978 per kilowatt of capacity to build and fuel a big gas-fired power plant, compared with $5,339 per kilowatt for a nuclear plant.¶ Already, the inexpensive natural gas is putting downward pressure on electricity costs for consumers and businesses.¶ The EIA has forecast that the nation will add 222 gigawatts of generating capacity between 2010 and 2035—equivalent to one-fifth of the current U.S. capacity. The biggest chunk of that addition—58%—will be fired by natural gas, it said, followed by renewable sources, including hydropower, at 31%, then coal at 8% and nuclear power at 4%.

#### Every renewable dollar takes money out of natural gas investment- even if it doesn’t actually make the market

Downey 2012 [Richard Downey Unatego Area Landowners Association 2012 JULY 29 “Natural Gas vs. Subsidized Renewables Is No Contest” http://eidmarcellus.org/marcellus-shale/renewables-versus-natural-gas-no-contest/11392/]

A “fractivist” ended the recent Otsego County Natural Gas Advisory Committee’s meeting by intoning the following statement: A dollar spent on natural gas is one less dollar spent on renewables.¶ Very deep, but what does this mean? It’s probably about subsidies, so let’s scroll back to Economics 101.¶ Demand determines where money is spent in free markets. However, in command-and-control societies, the money goes where the kings and commissars (the elites) deem it best. Our society is a little of both, but thankfully, still more of the former. So, in spite of loan guarantees, tax credits, state supported rebates, state mandates and quotas, direct subsidies and grants, and manipulated tariffs, renewables still fail to make the market.¶ Take solar heated homes. After decades of popularization and righteous approval, and with tons of subsidies, solar heated homes are still marginal in the United States. According to the 2010 Census (American Community Survey), there are only 38,000 in the entire country. In contrast, there are 57,000,000 homes heated with natural gas. Why? Natural gas is cheaper, more reliable, more adaptable to a mass market (i.e., scaleable), and more builder friendly. In other words, people like it.¶ This holds true for wind, biomass, hydro, wave, geothermal and other forms of renewable energy. Renewables gobble up massive subsidies and, yet, are nowhere near fossil fuel pricing. Competitive? Not even with the pork barrel.¶ But, hey, that doesn’t mean people can’t make a buck on them. Massive subsidies attract the wheeler/dealers and the crony capitalists. Never mind the business wont fly. When Uncle Sam picks up the tab, roll ‘em, and let it ride! More money where that came from, baby!

#### Natural gas cements climate leadership

**Casten 2009** (Sean Casten, president of Recycled Energy Development, December 16, 2009, “Natural gas as a near-term CO2 mitigation strategy,” Grist, http://goo.gl/b8z08)

Discussions of CO2 reduction tend to start from a presumption of near-term economic disruption coupled to long-term investment in green technology. The presumption isn’t right. The U.S. could reduce its total CO2 footprint by 14-20 percent tomorrow with no disruption in our access to energy services, without investing in any new infrastructure. The Waxman-Markey proposal to reduce CO2 emissions by 17 percent over 10 years is constrained only by its ambition. This near-term opportunity would be realized by ramping up our nation’s generation of electricity from gas and ramping down our generation from coal, taking advantage only of existing assets. Its scale and potential for immediate impact deserves consideration; even partial action towards this goal would have dramatic political and environmental consequences, establishing U.S. leadership and credibility in global climate negotiations.

#### Climate leadership five extinction threats- Biodiversity, soil erosion, ocean acidification, de-fo, pollution

**Khosla 2009** (Ashok Khosla, president of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, January 27, 2009, “A new President for the United States: We have a dream,” http://goo.gl/RQsL8)

A rejuvenated America, with a renewed purpose, commitment and energy to make its contribution once again towards a better world could well be the turning point that can reverse the current decline in the state of the global economy, the health of its life support systems and the morale of people everywhere. This extraordinary change in regime brings with it the promise of a deep change in attitudes and aspirations of Americans, a change that will lead, hopefully, to new directions in their nation’s policies and action. In particular, we can hope that from being a very reluctant partner in global discussions, especially on issues relating to environment and sustainable development, the United States will become an active leader in international efforts to address the Millennial threats now confronting civilization and even the survival of the human species. For the conservation of biodiversity, so essential to maintaining life on Earth, this promise of change has come not a moment too soon. It would be a mistake to put all of our hopes on the shoulder of one young man, however capable he might be. The environmental challenges the world is facing cannot be addressed by one country, let alone by one man. At the same time, an inspired US President guided by competent people, who does not shy away from exercising the true responsibilities and leadership his country is capable of, could do a lot to spur the international community into action. To paraphrase one of his illustrious predecessors, “the world asks for action and action now.” What was true in President Roosevelt’s America 77 years ago is even more appropriate today. From IUCN’s perspective, the first signals are encouraging. The US has seriously begun to discuss constructive engagement in climate change debates. With Copenhagen a mere 11 months away, this commitment is long overdue and certainly very welcome. Many governments still worry that if they set tough standards to control carbon emissions, their industry and agriculture will become uncompetitive, a fear that leads to a foot-dragging “you go first” attitude that is blocking progress. A positive intervention by the United States could provide the vital catalyst that moves the basis of the present negotiations beyond the narrowly defined national interests that lie at the heart of the current impasse. The logjam in international negotiations on climate change should not be difficult to break if the US were to lead the industrialized countries to agree that much of their wealth has been acquired at the expense of the environment (in this case greenhouse gases emitted over the past two hundred years) and that with the some of the benefits that this wealth has brought, comes the obligation to deal with the problems that have resulted as side-effects. With equitable entitlement to the common resources of the planet, an agreement that is fair and acceptable to all nations should be easy enough to achieve. Caps on emissions and sharing of energy efficient technologies are simply in the interest of everyone, rich or poor. And both rich and poor must now be ready to adopt less destructive technologies – based on renewables, efficiency and sustainability – both as a goal with intrinsic merit and also as an example to others. But climate is not the only critical global environmental issue that this new administration will have to deal with. Conservation of biodiversity, a crucial prerequisite for the wellbeing of all humanity, no less America, needs as much attention, and just as urgently. The United States’ self-interest in conserving living natural resources strongly converges with the global common good in every sphere: in the oceans, by arresting the precipitate decline of fish stocks and the alarming rise of acidification; on land, by regenerating the health of our soils, forests and rivers; and in the atmosphere by reducing the massive emission of pollutants from our wasteful industries, construction, agriculture and transport systems.

### Contention 1

#### Lots of problems with radical democracy

BY STUART SIM ‘Post’ or ‘Past’?: Does Post-Marxism Have Any Future? 2011 **last date cited**

Radical democracy is an interesting development; although it would have to be said it does have limitations and that so far it has promised more than it has delivered. As several critics have pointed out, there are some rather glaring ‘deficits’ in it as a political theory. It is unclear, for example, how we could form political institutions under its aegis: agonistic politics does not lend itself to that very easily, since it usually requires some measure of compromise and consensus between competing groups to establish anything viable in this line. As David Howarth has remarked of the problem of implementing radical democracy in the current political system, ‘less attention is paid to the economic, material, and institutional obstacles that block its realisation, as well as the precise composition and configuration of such impediments’ (Howarth 2008: 189), than should be by its leading theorists. Howarth and Jason Glynos go on to assert that radical democracy suffers from being essentially ‘theory-driven’ as a concept (Glynos and Howarth 2007: 167), thus substantially limiting its practical application: a criticism that might well be made of postmodernism in general when it comes to its political ambitions.

#### Causes more alienation because it precludes consensus-building

BY STUART SIM ‘Post’ or ‘Past’?: Does Post-Marxism Have Any Future? 2011 **last date cited**

The classical Marxist alternative to consensus is one-party rule, which is the antithesis of what this kind of a post-Marxist wants to see. We face the same dilemma here that we do with paganism, the central problem for anyone on the left who espouses a post-Marxist position, and that is how to justify value judgements. This returns again and again to haunt relativists, and it has to be admitted that it is a major obstacle to anything like post-Marxism making a major breakthrough into the arena of mass politics. Could you really have mass politics without some kind of consensus between competing factions? Even Mouffe seems to concede that the answer is probably no, although the way she puts this in her book On the Political raises some awkward questions: ‘A democratic society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries’ (Mouffe 2005: 120). It depends how you interpret ‘into question’ and ‘legitimate’, of course: one suspects that those words could only too easily be abused, by radical democrats as much as anyone, as Mouffe herself goes on more or less to admit when she cautions that: ‘The agonistic approach does not pretend to encompass all differences and to overcome all forms of exclusion’ (Mouffe 2005: 120). How this state of affairs differs from the kind of consensus we already see in play in parliamentary systems is by no means clear, and it sounds as if it would in its turn merely create yet another class of alienated individuals, thus storing up future trouble for the proposed ‘radical democratic’ society.

#### Violence is objectively decreasing due to western reason and liberal democracy- spreading those ideals is key to solve conflict

Pinker 2011 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

 With all its wars, murder and genocide, history might suggest that the taste for blood is human nature. Not so, argues Harvard Prof. Steven Pinker. He talks to WSJ's Gary Rosen about the decline in violence in recent decades and his new book, "The Better Angels of Our Nature." But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?" Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood. Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals. Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence. The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago. For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control. These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history. It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves. The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide. The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back. Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors. The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery. The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace. Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population). Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars. The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers. The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously. The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%. The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end. Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people. \* \* \* \* Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels. The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice. Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism. For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money. A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them. These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

#### We should evaluate actions by their managerial consequences - rolling back the steady evolution toward multilateral world peace should be avoided

http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1230-05.htm Gwynne **Dyer** December 30, 200**4** is a Canadian journalist based in London whose articles are published in 45 papers worldwide. This is an abridged version of the last chapter in his updated book, War, first published in 1985. His latest book is Future: Tense. The Coming Global Order, published by McClelland and Stewart. by the Toronto Star The End of War Our Task Over the Next Few Years is to Transform the World of Independent States into a Genuine Global Village by Gwynne Dyer

War is deeply embedded in our history and our culture, probably since before we were even fully human, but weaning ourselves away from it should not be a bigger mountain to climb than some of the other changes we have already made in the way we live, given the right incentives. And we have certainly been given the right incentives: The holiday from history that we have enjoyed since the early '90s may be drawing to an end, and another great-power war, fought next time with nuclear weapons, may be lurking in our future. The "firebreak" against nuclear weapons use that we began building after Hiroshima and Nagasaki has held for well over half a century now. But the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new powers is a major challenge to the stability of the system. So are the coming crises, mostly environmental in origin, which will hit some countries much harder than others, and may drive some to desperation. Add in the huge impending shifts in the great-power system as China and India grow to rival the United States in GDP over the next 30 or 40 years and it will be hard to keep things from spinning out of control. With good luck and good management, we may be able to ride out the next half-century without the first-magnitude catastrophe of a global nuclear war, but the potential certainly exists for a major die-back of human population. We cannot command the good luck, but good management is something we can choose to provide. It depends, above all, on preserving and extending the multilateral system that we have been building since the end of World War II. The rising powers must be absorbed into a system that emphasizes co-operation and makes room for them, rather than one that deals in confrontation and raw military power. If they are obliged to play the traditional great-power game of winners and losers, then history will repeat itself and everybody loses. Our hopes for mitigating the severity of the coming environmental crises also depend on early and concerted global action of a sort that can only happen in a basically co-operative international system. When the great powers are locked into a military confrontation, there is simply not enough spare attention, let alone enough trust, to make deals on those issues, so the highest priority at the moment is to keep the multilateral approach alive and avoid a drift back into alliance systems and arms races. And there is no point in dreaming that we can leap straight into some never-land of universal brotherhood; we will have to confront these challenges and solve the problem of war within the context of the existing state system. The solution to the state of international anarchy that compels every state to arm itself for war was so obvious that it arose almost spontaneously in 1918. The wars by which independent states had always settled their quarrels in the past had grown so monstrously destructive that some alternative system had to be devised, and that could only be a pooling of sovereignty, at least in matters concerning war and peace, by all the states of the world. So the victors of World War I promptly created the League of Nations. But the solution was as difficult in practice as it was simple in concept. Every member of the League of Nations understood that if the organization somehow acquired the ability to act in a concerted and effective fashion, it could end up being used against them, so no major government was willing to give the League of Nations any real power. Instead, they got World War II, and that war was so bad — by the end the first nuclear weapons had been used on cities — that the victors made a second attempt in 1945 to create an international organization that really could prevent war. They literally changed international law and made war illegal, but they were well aware that all of that history and all those reflexes were not going to vanish overnight. It would be depressing to catalogue the many failures of the United Nations, but it would also be misleading. The implication would be that this was an enterprise that should have succeeded from the start, and has failed irrevocably. On the contrary; it was bound to be a relative failure at the outset. It was always going to be very hard to persuade sovereign governments to surrender power to an untried world authority which might then make decisions that went against their particular interests. In the words of the traditional Irish directions to a lost traveler: "If that's where you want to get to, sir, I wouldn't start from here." But here is where we must start from, for it is states that run the world. The present international system, based on heavily armed and jealously independent states, often exaggerates the conflicts between the multitude of human communities in the world, but it does reflect an underlying reality: We cannot all get all we want, and some method must exist to decide who gets what. That is why neighboring states have lived in a perpetual state of potential war, just as neighboring hunter-gatherer bands did 20,000 years ago. If we now must abandon war as a method of settling our disputes and devise an alternative, it only can be done with the full co-operation of the world's governments. That means it certainly will be a monumentally difficult and lengthy task: Mistrust reigns everywhere and no nation will allow even the least of its interests to be decided upon by a collection of foreigners. Even the majority of states that are more or less satisfied with their borders and their status in the world would face huge internal opposition from nationalist elements to any transfer of sovereignty to the United Nations. The good news for humans is that it looks like peaceful conditions, once established, can be maintained. And if baboons can do it, why not us? The U.N. as presently constituted is certainly no place for idealists, but they would feel even more uncomfortable in a United Nations that actually worked as was originally intended. It is an association of poachers turned game-keepers, not an assembly of saints, and it would not make its decisions according to some impartial standard of justice. There is no impartial concept of justice to which all of mankind would subscribe and, in any case, it is not "mankind" that makes decisions at the United Nations, but governments with their own national interests to protect. To envision how a functioning world authority might reach its decisions, at least in its first century or so, begin with the arrogant promotion of self-interest by the great powers that would continue to dominate U.N. decision-making and add in the crass expediency masquerading as principle that characterizes the shifting coalitions among the lesser powers in the present General Assembly: It would be an intensely political process. The decisions it produced would be kept within reasonable bounds only by the need never to act in a way so damaging to the interest of any major member or group of members that it forced them into total defiance, and so destroyed the fundamental consensus that keeps war at bay. There is nothing shocking about this. National politics in every country operates with the same combination: a little bit of principle, a lot of power, and a final constraint on the ruthless exercise of that power based mainly on the need to preserve the essential consensus on which the nation is founded and to avoid civil war. In an international organization whose members represent such radically different traditions, interests, and levels of development, the proportion of principle to power is bound to be even lower. It's a pity that there is no practical alternative to the United Nations, but there isn't. If the abolition of great-power war and the establishment of international law is truly a hundred-year project, then we are running a bit behind schedule but we have made substantial progress. We have not had World War III, and that is thanks at least in part to the United Nations, which gave the great powers an excuse to back off from several of their most dangerous confrontations without losing face. No great power has fought another since 1945, and the wars that have broken out between middle-sized powers from time to time — Arab-Israeli wars and Indo-Pakistani wars, mostly — seldom lasted more than a month, because the U.N.'s offers of ceasefires and peacekeeping troops offered a quick way out for the losing side. If you assessed the progress that has been made since 1945 from the perspective of that terrifying time, the glass would look at least half-full. The enormous growth of international organizations since 1945, and especially the survival of the United Nations as a permanent forum where the states of the world are committed to avoiding war (and often succeed), has already created a context new to history. The present political fragmentation of the world into more than 150 stubbornly independent territorial units will doubtless persist for a good while to come. But it is already becoming an anachronism, for, in every other context, from commerce, technology, and the mass media to fashions in ideology, music, and marriage, the outlines of a single global culture (with wide local variations) are visibly taking shape. It is very likely that we began our career as a rising young species by exterminating our nearest relatives, the Neanderthals, and it is entirely possible we will end it by exterminating ourselves, but the fact that we have always had war as part of our culture does not mean that we are doomed always to fight wars. Other aspects of our behavioral repertoire are a good deal more encouraging. There is, for example, a slow but quite perceptible revolution in human consciousness taking place: the last of the great redefinitions of humanity. At all times in our history, we have run our affairs on the assumption that there is a special category of people (our lot) whom we regard as full human beings, having rights and duties approximately equal to our own, and whom we ought not to kill even when we quarrel. Over the past 15,000 or 20,000 years we have successively widened this category

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from the original hunting-and-gathering band to encompass larger and larger groups. First it was the tribe of some thousands of people bound together by kinship and ritual ties; then the state, where we recognize our shared interests with millions of people whom we don't know and will never meet; and now, finally, the entire human race. There was nothing in the least idealistic or sentimental in any of the previous redefinitions. They occurred because they were useful in advancing people's material interests and ensuring their survival. The same is true for this final act of redefinition: We have reached a point where our moral imagination must expand again to embrace the whole of mankind. It's no coincidence that the period in which the concept of the national state is finally coming under challenge by a wider definition of humanity is also the period that has seen history's most catastrophic wars, for they provide the practical incentive for change. But the transition to a different system is a risky business: The danger of another world war which would cut the whole process short is tiny in any given year, but cumulatively, given how long the process of change will take, it is extreme. That is no reason not to keep trying. Our task over the next few generations is to transform the world of independent states in which we live into some sort of genuine international community. If we succeed in creating that community, however quarrelsome, discontented, and full of injustice it will probably be, then we shall effectively have abolished the ancient institution of warfare. Good riddance.

#### The abandonment of ‘democracy’ fails

**Little, 2010** (Adrian Little, Associate Professor and Reader, Political Theory – University of Melbourne, “Democratic Melancholy: On the Sacrosanct Place of Democracy in Radical Democratic Theory,” Political Studies 58:5, p. 971 – 987)

Put simply, if democratic theorists do want to retain a privileged position for democracy, then they need to grapple with what the term ‘democracy’ actually conveys in contem- porary politics. Resistance to the hegemonic project of neo-liberals and neo-conservatives needs more than an articulation of a purer form of democracy than is currently in existence. For example, Connolly’s ethos of pluralisation may well be beneficial but it is unlikely to succeed in the face of the deeply entrenched understanding of what democracy stands for today. For Alain Badiou, the dominant idea of democracy elicits an anti-political sensibility in its status as the signifier of a pursuit of consensus through which Western societies reinforce the view that ‘humanity aspires to democracy, and any subjectivity suspected of not being democratic is regarded as pathological’ (Badiou, 2005b, p. 78). Addressing this sensibility does not require radical democrats to relinquish democracy but it should encourage them to analyse democracy, recognise its flaws and the likely continuation of aspects of these problems in a more radical incarnation. Such a process requires a decon- struction of the terminology in the democratic lexicon – popular sovereignty, rule of law, political equality and so forth – as well as a genealogical investigation of the emergence of the institutions and structures that have been developed under the auspices of this lexicon (Hoy, 2004). Theorists such as Brown, Butler and Connolly have made significant and persuasive contributions to the critique of liberalism in contemporary political theory, but, in an inhospitable environment, they have not subjected democracy to the same levels of critical scrutiny. Laclau comments that it is not the case that: all the elements of an emerging configuration have to be entirely new, but rather that the articulating point, the partial object around which the hegemonic formation is reconstituted as a new totality, does not derive its central role from any logic already operating within the preceding situation (Laclau, 2005, p. 228). What is important here is the fact that any alternative formation to liberal democracy will also be incapable of fully satisfying the pursuit of a consensual combination of the demands of liberty and equality. It is by critically analysing the theory and practice of democracy and evaluating its mechanisms and justifications that we can come to understand its limitations and the exclusions that are inherent in its operation. It is only through such a process that it is possible to comprehend the inevitable failure of democracy to meet the lofty objectives that are set for it in complex societies. This approach identifies the ‘constitutive lack’ at the heart of democratic theory (Laclau, 2005, p. 244) which entails the importance of retaining the pursuit of democracy but with the concomitant recognition that democracy is not sacrosanct. This understanding of democracy would recognise its ‘constitutive failure’, that is, the impossibility of complex, pluralistic societies generating a consensual, democratic voice that is wholly inclusive. It is precisely this recognition that is precluded by the failure of Brown, Butler and Connolly to engage with democracy in a suitably critical fashion. Ultimately, this takes them down the blind alley of ‘democratic melancholy’ whereby they can only criticise the fusion of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism rather than establishing a dynamic understanding of democracy with the idea of ‘constitutive failure’ at its heart. This reinforces the view that democracy is sacrosanct and that ‘genuine’ democracy can be achieved if only it can be freed from its strangulation by neo-liberal and neo-conservative approaches.

#### Util is good and doesn’t devalue life

Revesz 2008 Richard L. Revesz (Dean and Lawrence King Professor of Law at New York University School of Law, JD Yale Law School) and Michael A Livermore. (JD NYU School of Law, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Integrity, and Managing director of the NYU Law Review). Retaking Rationality How Cots-Benefit Analysis Can Better protect the Environment and Our Health. 2008. P. 1-4.

Governmental decisions are also fundamentally different from personal decisions in that they often affect people in the aggregate. In our individual lives, we come into contact with at least some of the consequences of our decisions. If we fail to consult a map, we pay the price: losing valuable time driving around in circles and listening to the complaints of our passengers. We are constantly confronted with the consequences of the choices that we have made. Not so for governments, however, which exercise authority by making decisions at a distance. Perhaps one of the most challenging aspects of governmental decisions is that they require a special kind of compassion—one that can seem, at first glance, cold and calculating, the antithesis of empathy. The aggregate and complex nature of governmental decisions does not address people as human beings, with concerns and interests, families and emotional relationships, secrets and sorrows. Rather, people are numbers stacked in a column or points on a graph, described not through their individual stories of triumph and despair, but by equations, functions, and dose-response curves. The language of governmental decisionmaking can seem to—and to a certain extent does—ignore what makes individuals unique and morally important. But, although the language of bureaucratic decisionmaking can be dehumanizing, it is also a prerequisite for the kind of compassion that is needed in contemporary society. Elaine Scarry has developed a comparison between individual compassion and statistical compassion.' Individual compassion is familiar—when we see a person suffering, or hear the story of some terrible tragedy, we are moved to take action. Statistical compassion seems foreign—we hear only a string of numbers but must comprehend "the concrete realities embedded there."' Individual compassion derives from our social nature, and may be hardwired directly into the human brain.' Statistical compassion calls on us to use our higher reasoning power to extend our natural compassion to the task of solving more abstract—but no less real—problems. Because compassion is not just about making us feel better—which we could do as easily by forgetting about a problem as by addressing it—we have a responsibility to make the best decisions that we can. This book argues that cost-benefit analysis, properly conducted, can improve environmental and public health policy. Cost-benefit analysis—the translation of human lives and acres of forest into the language of dollars and cents—can seem harsh and impersonal. But such an approach is also necessary to improve the quality of decisions that regulators make. Saving the most lives, and best protecting the quality of our environment and our health—in short, exercising our compassion most effectively—requires us to step back and use our best analytic tools. Sometimes, in order to save a life, we need to treat a person like a number. This is the challenge of statistical compassion. This book is about making good decisions. It focuses on the area of environmental, health and safety regulation. These regulations have been the source of numerous and hard-fought controversies over the past several decades, particularly at the federal level. Reaching the right decisions in the areas of environmental protection, increasing safety, and improving public health is clearly of high importance. Although it is admirable (and fashionable) for people to buy green or avoid products made in sweatshops, efforts taken at the individual level are not enough to address the pressing problems we face—there is a vital role for government in tackling these issues, and sound collective decisions concerning regulation are needed. There is a temptation to rely on gut-level decisionmaking in order to avoid economic analysis, which, to many, is a foreign language on top of seeming cold and unsympathetic. For government to make good decisions, however, it cannot abandon reasoned analysis. Because of the complex nature of governmental decisions, we have no choice but to deploy complex analytic tools in order to make the best choices possible. Failing to use these tools, which amounts to abandoning our duties to one another, is not a legitimate response. Rather, we must exercise statistical compassion by recognizing what numbers of lives saved represent: living and breathing human beings, unique, with rich inner lives and an interlocking web of emotional relationships. The acres of a forest can be tallied up in a chart, but that should not blind us to the beauty of a single stand of trees. We need to use complex tools to make good decisions while simultaneously remembering that we are not engaging in abstract exercises, but that we are having real effects on people and the environment. In our personal lives, it would be unwise not to shop around for the best price when making a major purchase, or to fail to think through our options when making a major life decision. It is equally foolish for government to fail to fully examine alternative policies when making regulatory decisions with life-or-death consequences. This reality has been recognized by four successive presidential administrations. Since 1981, the cost-benefit analysis of major regulations has been required by presidential order. Over the past twenty-five years, however, environmental and other progressive groups have declined to participate in the key governmental proceedings concerning the cost-benefit analysis of federal regulations, instead preferring to criticize the technique from the outside. The resulting asymmetry in political participation has had profound negative consequences, both for the state of federal regulation and for the technique of cost-benefit analysis itself. Ironically, this state of affairs has left progressives open to the charge of rejecting reason, when in fact strong environmental and public health pro-grams are often justified by cost-benefit analysis. It is time for progressive groups, as well as ordinary citizens, to retake the high ground by embracing and reforming cost-benefit analysis. The difference between being unthinking—failing to use the best tools to analyze policy—and unfeeling—making decisions without compassion—is unimportant: Both lead to bad policy. Calamities can result from the failure to use either emotion or reason. Our emotions provide us with the grounding for our principles, our innate interconnectedness, and our sense of obligation to others. We use our powers of reason to build on that emotional foundation, and act effectively to bring about a better world.

### Contention 2

#### Predictions inevitable and good

Friedman 2008 George Friedman (founder of Stratfor) May 2008 “The Love of One’s Own and the Importance of Place” Stratfor

Forecasting is built into the human condition. Each action a human being takes is intended to have a certain outcome. The right to assume that outcome derives from a certain knowledge of how things work. Sometimes, the action has unexpected and unintended consequences. The knowledge of how things work is imperfect. But there is a huge gulf between the uncertainty of a prediction and the impossibility of a prediction. When I get up and turn on the hot water, it is with the expectation that the hot water will be there. It isn’t always there and I may not have a full understanding of why it will be there, but in general, it is there and I can predict that. A life is made up of a fabric of such expectations and predictions. There is no action taken that is not done with the expectation, reasonable or not, erroneous or not, of some predictable consequence. The search for predictability suffuses all of the human condition. Students choose careers by trying to predict what would please them when they are 30 years older, what would be useful and therefore make them money and so on. Businesses forecast what can be sold and to whom. We forecast the weather, the winners of elections, the consequences of war and so on. There is no level on which human beings live that they don’t make forecasts and, therefore, on which they don’t act as if the world were to some degree predictable.

#### Even without absolute truth we can create provisional consensus and common understanding

Ferguson 2002 Yale Ferguson (Professor of International Relations at Rutgers) and Richard Mansbach (Professor of International Relations at Iowa State) 2002 International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

#### Micro political change won’t trickle up

**Jensen, PhD student in Philosophy, 2009**

(Tim, “Bridging Micro and Macro :: Setting the Stage”, 4-6, <http://candidcandidacy.wordpress.com/2009/04/06/bridging-micro-and-macro-setting-the-stage/>)

Oliver Marchart asks the same question in his essay, “Bridging the Micro-Macro Gap: Is There Such a Thing as a Post-subcultural Politics?“ “What criteria,” he asks, have to be met by micro-practices in order to ‘go macro’? Do we need a new concept of ‘organization’? Can there be a subcultural politics of pure particularism or does it take a dimension of universalism?’ Marchart begins by debunking what he sees as a heroism myth that dominates subcultures and those who study them academically. While others have certainly critiqued the narrative of “co-optation,” it’s still necessary to do so, and Marchart does it swiftly and with eloquence. I say that it’s still necessary because there are still plenty of folks (punks, activists, liberals) who believe they can “drop-out” of capitalism in many ways and narratives of “selling out” continue to proliferate. In this set-up, a subculture is designated as “authentic” to the degree that it remains unappropriated by the mainstream. The group or set of practices remains heroic in relation to how much it resists commodification and recuperation. Marchart notes that this narrative of the process of subculture’s incorporation into the mainstream construes “subcultures as some sort of substance–noise from the viewpoint of the dominant system, and the precedes any cooptation by the latter” (author’s emphasis 87). This myth is used to show how the “defending of micro-political practices eo ipso” obviates any move to the macro-political, since those micro-practices are always already political, “simply by virtue of resisting cooptation” (88). Some theorists laud this indirect, style-driven form of dissent and its oblique challenge to exploitative powers. Not Marchart, for sure. And I have some pretty serious reservations about it, too. Who has time to take direct action when one is busy looking like they’re constantly dissenting? (This also becomes an issue, as we shall see in later posts, when dealing with internet cultures of protest.) Much of postmodernism and cultural studies in particular has done excellent–and needed–work in revealing the political nature of our everd ay acts. The cultural and the political have been blurred for some time now. But you can see where this may stunt the move to macro action: if we’re always already political, how do we judge a scale of action? I agree with Marchart that, “What is needed today is an analysis of the passage between culture and macro-politics, that is, an analysis of the process of ‘becoming macro’” (90). We’re missing an understanding of the links between ever day life and organized, collective action, especially with regard to the communicative process. So we must ask, is an answer to be found in the micro-politics of everyday life or in the marco-political movements of collective will and deep structural and cultural reorganization? Where do we start in attempting to make sense of this line between micro and macro; and what role do information communication technologies play in the communication process of this movement between micro and macro? Marchart lists four preconditions for the passage of micro going macro: 1) A situation of explicit antagonization; 2) The emergence of a collectivity; 3) The function of organization; 4) A movement towards universalization. So, for Marchart, what is necessary is a swing towards the macro, a recognition that as long as resistance to hegemony remains at the level of symbolic rituals of the micro-political, we’re in trouble. Only when these tactics form a collective will they become politicized. Despite using a term like micro-political, Marchart argues there is no politics of the individual; politics is collective. And that is why he argues for theorization to begin at macro-levels.